The Kennedy Challenge
"How the hell can you tell?" snapped President John F. Kennedy, when asked to rank American presidents for the Schlesinger poll in 1962. He was challenging Schlesinger's son, Arthur, Jr., historian and presidential aide. Only the president himself can know his "real pressures" and "real alternatives," he insisted, though a detailed study could help reveal the differences made by individuals. "Would Lincoln have been judged so great a President, if he had lived long enough to face the almost insoluble problem of Reconstruction?" he mused. ' Today, Kennedy's words reek with prophetic irony. Like Lincoln, he, too, was assassinated and succeeded by another President Johnson, leaving historians to debate a similar question: Would Kennedy's stature have fared so well if he had confronted the intractable dilemmas of Vietnam?
Of the five presidents from Harry S Truman to Richard M. Nixon who contributed to the ultimate disaster, it was President Lyndon B. Johnson who emerged as the fall guy, the culprit primarily re-352 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS sponsible for Vietnam in popular memory and scholarship. Eisenhower and Truman have escaped relatively unscathed.
"One of Ike's greatest accomplishments was staying out of Vietnam," claims the late Stephen E. Ambrose, a point echoed by several Eisenhower revisionists who flourished during the 1980s. Thanks to his "hard-headed military reasoning," he avoided the calamity which ensnared his successors, Kennedy and Johnson. This view is a distortion of history. Eisenhower played a major role, arguably the most crucial role of all presidents, in America's slide down the "slippery slope" into Vietnam. 2 Johnson's role as arch-villain, simply stated, boils down to two major arguments: his key policy decisions which "Americanized" the war and his flawed personality which produced them. Tragically, the United States was led by a man full of swagger and cowboy machismo, and hell-bent not to be the first president to lose a war-a "man of the fifties," from Texas where "McCarthyism was particularly virulent," as David Halberstram puts it. 3 After committing American ground forces to battle, "retreat would have been difficult for any man," declares Bernard Brodie, "and for a Lyndon B. Johnson close to impossible." 4 H. R. McMaster has forcefully restated the prevailing view in recent years, emphasizing the "uniquely human failure" on the part of Johnson and his advisers, their "arrogance, weakness, lying . . . and, above all, the abdication of responsibility to the American people." 5 Johnson's warmonger image looms larger in the glare of the "IfKennedy-had-lived-debate." Better versed in foreign affairs and adamantly opposed to sending American boys to fight an Asian war, JFK probably would have piloted the nation clear of Vietnam, many observers contend. His assassination was a major cause of America's "1965 commitment to the war in Vietnam," claims Brodie. 6 
Eisenhower's Vietnam Policy
President Kennedy, however, never faced Johnson's dilemmas. His words indicate he would have been less disposed to condemn his successor than to explore the pressures and limited alternatives which, he felt, hemmed in all presidents. His "How the hell can you tell?" stands as a challenge to historians to examine Johnson's policies in the light of the total situation that shaped them-a predicament seeded largely by Eisenhower May 1954 , and peacemakers at Geneva drew up the blueprint for Vietnam's orderly transition to independence. The Geneva Accords ("The Final Declaration of Geneva on Indochina") temporarily divided Vietnam into northern and southern "zones" which were to be reunited by general elections under international supervision in July 1956.7 In short, a "South Vietnam" was not supposed to exist-only one nation forged from two "zones."
After announcing its support for the Accords, Washington secretly planned to sabotage them amid reports that elections would sweep the Communist revolutionary hero, Ho Chi Minh, to a landslide victory. To preempt Geneva's looming "disaster," warned the National Security Council, the Administration should try to "prevent a Communist victory through all Vietnam elections" and "support a friendly noncommunist South Vietnam." 8 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles soon organized the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to contain Communism in Asia, extending its protection to southern Vietnam-as though it 7. In line with the principles of "independence, unity and territorial integrity" for Vietnam, the Accords declared, the "military demarcation line [separating the two zones] is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary," "Geneva Conference: Indo China," Washington's strategy was to blame Hanoi for the failure to hold elections by demanding conditions for "free elections" which the Communists would surely reject. Unhappily, neither Vietnam cooperated. Diem, southern Vietnam's new ruler, was too weak even to give "lip service," and appeared disposed to repudiate the Geneva Accords outright rather than "play the game." The Viet Minh, were ready to counter with "moderate proposals"which would undermine Washington's plans to blame them for the failed elections. See FRUS, 1955 -1957 were an independent nation. SEATO would invest the emerging commitment with an aura of "solemn" obligation, reinforcing the impulse toward future military interventions.
The entangling web thickened as Washington backed the new government of Ngo Dinh Diem and his cancellation of the 1956 elections and poured massive amounts of military and economic aid into creating a new nation out of France's former colonial fragment. Eisenhower's "nation-building" represented a drastic escalation of American intrusions into Third World countries. Going beyond Truman's interventions to bolster dictatorial regimes against revolutionaries, Eisenhower had already authorized the overthrow of reform governments in Iran and Guatemala. Now came the boldest move yet-carving a new nation out of a patch of land which, by international agreement, was supposed to become part of a united Vietnam.
More ominous, was the evolving set of ideas solidifying Eisenhower's commitments in which he defined South Vietnam's survival as a major American security interest, especially with his domino theory, and enmeshed America's global containment structure with SEATO. The result was a toxic blend of Cold War ideology and distorted history: that communism, not Vietnamese nationalism, was the driving force behind the Vietnam conflict; that Ho was a puppet and Hanoi a pawn in the "Soviet-Chinese ... drive to dominate the world," in spite of deepening divisions between the three Communist countries and Ho's hostility toward all foreign control, Communist or capitalist. 9 Most treacherous was the notion that would become the central rationale for America's war: that North Vietnam started it, and America's cause was to preserve an independent South Vietnam against Hanoi's aggression. Hidden in the ideological fog was the fact that Saigon's very existence-a violation of Geneva and an affront to Vietnamese nationalism-was a provocation for war. 10. Geneva's vague guidelines for implementing the 1956 elections, Anderson claims, "left room" for Washington "to maneuver against communist expansionism" in South Vietnam. Yet, the conflict between U.S. policy and the Geneva provisions was clear enough to spur the campaign to derail the Geneva "disaster," as Washington regarded it, and provoke international criticism over its rejection of the 1956 elections. Anderson, Trapped, pp. 62-63,159. The Accords' provision for the "expression of the national will" through unifying elections approximated a "mandate from heaven" which for many Vietnamese already belonged to Ho Chi Minh. "'There is no proper grass roots support of any leader in Viet Nam, leaving aside Ho Chi Minh,"' reported General Lawton J. Collins, Eisenhower Washington's official interpretation blaming the conflict on North Vietnam, contradicted its own intelligence sources as reflected in the Pentagon Papers: "Most of those who took up arms [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] were South Vietnamese" fighting for causes which "were by no means contrived in North Vietnam."' 3 In fact, it was the study of Eisenhower's policies, the alleged perversity and deception buried in them, that radicalized Daniel Ellsberg, accelerating his transition from hawkish defense-establishment official to the rebel whistle blower who later exposed the secret documents dubbed as the "Pentagon Papers." '' 4 11. The anti-Communist campaign was simply the most provocative issue among Diem's blunders, which included the suppression of village councils, the reversal of Viet Minh land reforms, the anti-Buddhist policies, and the diversion of financial aid to the military while ignoring the pressing need for economic development 12. American intelligence reports were close to the enemy's interpretation of the conflict, as McNamara learned during the 1998 dialogues between former American leaders and their Vietnamese foes. After years of struggle against Japanese invaders and French colonialists, Hanoi was in no mood for more war even though it deemed it justified by Washington's violation of the Accords. Ho's orders to the southern allies to refrain from "armed struggle" while the "Diem puppet regime ... carried out a bloody fascist repression," as General Van Tra put it, provoked considerable anger against the North. Hanoi's reluctant intervention in 1959 was a far cry from American claims attributing the war to Communist aggression from the North. See McNamara, Argument Without End, pp. 179-80; 196-97.
13. Pentagon Papers (NYT ed.), p. 67. See also, PP, 1: 622-27. 14. As a researcher on the Vietnam history project launched by McNamara, Ellsberg was stunned at the "brazen" falsehoods which had shaped his own hawkish views when, for the first time in 1967, he examined the secret documents recording Eisenhower's policies: Washington's claims asserting that "the accords had created two separate, independent states, North and South Vietnam." After reviewing Eisenhower's decisions to "overturn" Geneva and support Diem's "police state," and then the documents recording Truman's support for French colonialism, he could no longer regard Vietnam as a civil war. It was nothing less than "a war of ... American aggression," which he had promoted. These discoveries would help drive him to the rebellious act which, he feared, could lead to life imprisonment: the unleashing of the classified "Pentagon Papers" to the press. Ellsberg 
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Hence, Eisenhower's legacy included a cluster of historical ideas at odds with historical realities. "Our ignorance" of Vietnam's history, was among the "major causes for our disaster in Vietnam," claims Robert S. McNamara, defense secretary to both Kennedy and Johnson." 5 Johnson's advisers might have surmounted that ignorance, he suggests, were it not for the crippling purge of Asian experts from the State Department sacrificed to the "McCarthy hysteria" during Eisenhower's administration. Without their "nuanced insights" advisers "badly misread China's objectives," underestimated Ho's nationalism and failed to grasp the bad blood between North Vietnam and China." 6 Journalist Theodore White reached the same conclusion years after suffering threats to his own livelihood for testifying on behalf of respected foreign service officer John Paton Davies. Cowed into silence, himself, as America drifted toward disaster, he later concluded that the McCarthyite purgers had "poke [d] SEATO, commitments to South Vietnam, an ironclad mind-set tightening those bonds, a crippled State Department, the politics of anticommunism-all these would not have been enough to force Johnson to "cross the Rubicon" in 1965, had Eisenhower picked an ally strong enough to fight its own battles. But South Vietnam, devastated by war, riddled by class and religious conflicts, ruled by a despised despot, and dependent on a ragtag army tainted by prior support for the French, was a loser from the start. Diem was widely viewed as an American pawn in the familiar pattern of "subservience to foreigners," claimed Truong Nhu Tang, a former leader in the National Liberation Front. 2 0
Eisenhower drew his containment line right through the jungle against guerilla forces highly skilled in jungle warfare. In Ho Chi Minh, he chose a formidable adversary, steeled by decades of struggle and revered as the heroic symbol of Vietnamese patriotism. "Had it looked all over the world," writes George C. Herring, "the United States could not have chosen a less promising place for an experiment in nation building. America was already caught in a swelling current of commitments, perceptions and jarring events abroad, dragging the nation and its reluctant president toward disaster.
Shortly after taking office, LBJ was zapped with news that things in South Vietnam were going much worse than previously thought-unnerving reports of political chaos and military incompetence, of the Viet Cong expanding its territorial control, of a rising tide of troops and supplies pouring down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the North. A latent contradiction in Eisenhower's policy and Kennedy's rhetoric was rising to the surface: that South Vietnam's survival was a vital U.S. security interest; but its soldiers, not Americans, must do the fighting and dying. 3 9 Feeling like a "catfish" which had "just grabbed a big juicy worm with a right sharp hook" in it, LBJ was slipping toward a crossroads no other president had to face: either abandon South Vietnam to communism or send in American forces to save it. 40 But what exactly would be the "domino effect," he queried the CIA, if Saigon fell (along with endangered Laos). The response was electrifying. Having committed itself "persistently" and "emphatically" to preventing a Communist takeover, the agency reported, failure there would not only endanger East Asia, but would "seriously debase" American credibility elsewhere, vindicating Chinese claims that the United States was a "'paper tiger"' and that the underdeveloped world was "ripe for revolution." It confirmed the administration's worst fears, McNamara recalls, that the "West's containment policy was at serious risk in Vietnam." 4 1
The emerging "credibility argument" was becoming increasingly dominant in the frantic memos blanketing the administration as it confronted Saigon's impending collapse. For ten years, Vietnam had been ballyhooed as Washington's line in the sand, the test case for American reliability in the global struggle against Communism. 4 
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importance or the specter of tumbling dominos in Asia, the sheer fact of American commitments made and enshrined in SEATO would weigh heavily against arguments for abandoning Vietnam. "If we ran out on Southeast Asia," LBJ later wrote, "I could see trouble ahead in every part of the globe" opening "the path to World War III."43
From government offices to editorial boards, the simple phrase, "we're there," packed a wallop even among those uneasy over the Vietnam commitment. Maybe "we shouldn't have been there in the first place," mused Washington Post publisher, Katherine Graham, after visiting Vietnam. But "we were there," leaving "no choice but to help the South Vietnamese" fight Communist guerillas. Her editor, Russ Wiggins, likewise supported Johnson's war policy, even though he longed for an alternative without destroying America's "international position. "144 The spell cast by the credibility doctrine may seem far-fetched today, but for Johnson's generation, the solemn "promises of 1954" were heavily charged by the "lessons of the 1930s:" appeasement at Munich, followed by the traumas of World War II, postwar Communist expansions in Europe and Asia and more recent crises in Africa and Latin America. 4 5
The Agony of Decision Making
The central rationale for going to war-North Vietnam's alleged aggression against South Vietnam-was always a stretch, especially during the Eisenhower years when Hanoi held its fire while Washington split Vietnam in two. But by the mid-sixties, Communist leaders, themselves, were stoking American fears that Vietnam was the cutting edge of global Communist expansion. Soviet and Chinese officials had announced support for "wars of national liberation" and Hanoi had identified her cause with the "socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union against American imperialism." 4 6 Beijing's aid to Hanoi, Moscow's policy shift to send large-scale modern weapons to Hanoi, and Hanoi's increasing control over the war in the South, all reinforced American images of North Vietnam In these circumstances, LBJ was no loose cannon itching for a showdown. Recorded phone conversations, recently released, reveal a troubled president turning to "outsiders" like UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and Senator Richard Russell, groping for alternatives to war. In rambling comments laced with angst, he talked of Americans who knew little about Vietnam and "care a hell of a lot less," of that "little old sergeant that works for me" and his six children, and "every time I think about ... Their replies hardly calmed the presidential tremors. Stevenson had been "shuddering this thing for three years," and now, "you don't have any alternatives," he feared. "And it's a hell of an alternative." "It was "the damn worst mess I ever saw," added Russell.
"I just don't know what to do." 4 9
In the following months, Johnson continued to agonize over the bitter choices toward which events were dragging him, worrying over provoking Chinese intervention, fretting over how "damned easy [it is] to get into a war" but "awfully hard" to get out. 50 But practically speaking, "we're in there." And abandoning "a solemn commitment" would debase "our word" and encourage aggression in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. 5 " Nations are prisoners of their past-especially the perceptions through which they interpret their past. What are the odds that Kennedy or other presidents would have chosen peace over war given the rush of events and the entrenched ideas governing American thought about 47 . Cooperation between the three Communist powers masked deep hostilities simmering beneath the surface. Soviet documents made available during the 1990s clearly indicate the Soviet Union's repugnance for war and its efforts to prod both Washington and Hanoi toward a peaceful settlement. Knopf, 1964 Knopf, , 1965 Knopf, , 1988 , pp. 177-78. Halberstram entertained a "very frail" hope that eleventh-hour desperation might force the Vietnamese factions to unite and mount a viable military force against the enemy. posal-to keep sacrificing lives for the incredible objective of losing "honorably"-underscores the depths of Johnson's dilemma.
While others dabbled in abstract solutions and Congressmen shuddered over rumors that he might stick them with the war decision, 59 LBJ chose to bite the bullet, himself, when "every choice presented the possibility of disaster," declares Michael Lind. 60 When Senator George McGovern gave him a memorandum explaining why the current military involvement was wrong, Johnson exploded: "Don't give me another g .... history lesson ... . I don't need a lecture on where we went wrong. I've got to deal with where we are now.""61
By early 1965, nothing was working. Washington had poured in huge weapons supplies and 23,000 military advisers, launched covert 34-A attacks against North Vietnam, expanded presidential war-making powers with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution-and still the flow of troops and supplies from the North accelerated along with Communist victories in the field and political coups in Saigon.
On January 27, 1965, the crisis entered "the most crucial phase of America's thirty-year involvement in Indochina," according to McNamara, with McGeorge Bundy's "Fork-in-the-road" memo signaling that Johnson's "middle course" was leading to "disastrous defeat." 62 With South Vietnamese morale sinking while America withheld its "enormous power," it was time for "harder choices": either commit American forces "to force a change in Communist 
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to salvage "what little can be preserved." Secretary of State Dean Rusk, dreading both options, clung to the crumbling status quo, hoping desperately to make "our present policy work."" 3 Presidential pressures mounted rapidly in the following weeks, primed by a Viet Cong attack on Americans at Pleiku, February 7, and unanimous decisions from the JCS and National Security Council demanding a systematic air war against North Vietnam. A cascade of memos circulating through the administration reflected an emerging consensus: with time running out in Vietnam, American military intervention offered the best hope of changing the military balance to achieve meaningfLil negotiations. 6 4 It was at this critical juncture that Kennedy had planned to withdraw from Vietnam. Given his absence, supporters can more readily speculate that he would have swerved clear of the impending disaster. Eisenhower revisionists have no such alibi.
Arriving at the White House on February 17, the former president spent two and a half hours sounding a familiar theme for LBJ and his advisers: "Munichs win nothing." Endorsing the proposed air war against the North, and the commitment of U.S. combat forces, if necessary, Ike warned that they must negotiate from strength, not from the current "disastrous" weakness. 6 5 His words, together with a more hawkish stance taken by Rusk and George Ball, Johnson's most ardent antiwar adviser, virtually "preordained" the result, McNamara claims. 6 6 "Operation Rolling Thunder" was unleashed against the North, March 2, and U.S. ground troops arrived six days later to protect the air bases but soon expanded in numbers and combat operations. 6 7 Unfortunately, these measures simply revealed the futility of America's back-up role in Vietnam, a point ominously conveyed by U.S. Commander William Westmoreland's "bombshell," as McNamara dubbed his June 7 cable-a jarring message of rising enemy power and allied disintegration, culminating in an urgent plea for open-ended escalation of U.S. combat forces. 6 8 "We're in a hell of a mess," McNamara groaned to colleagues the following day. It was the beginning of a frenzied, seven-week search for "the least bad road." 6 9 And pressures to pick all-out war as the "least bad" option were intense.
For one thing, there was ambivalent news from the front: bad news, scoring the urgent need for American forces, and good news, indicating that beefed-up allied forces were taking a heavy toll on the VC, raising hopes that increased American power would "bring victory over time." 7 0 A Rand report based on interviews with enemy prisoners and defectors, for example, reflected their increasing doubts of Communist victory. 71 By the mid-sixties, the military establishment had done a 180 since the days they had opposed Eisenhower's entry into the Vietnam imbroglio. Fed up with "fighting the war on the enemy's terms" the JCS since January, 1964, had been pressing LBJ to send U.S. air and ground forces into direct combat. 7 2 Their hawkish voices undoubtedly muted Johnson's vexing doubts over American military prospects. At a JCS meeting, July 22, 1965, General Harold K. Johnson glibly summarized the options: "Least desirable alternative is getting out. Second least is doing what we are doing. Best is to get in and get the job done." The Marines, Johnson was assured, would "force" the enemy "to the Conference table." 7 3 "You must take the fight to the enemy," breezed JCS Chairman General Earle Wheeler on one occasion. "No one ever won a battle sitting on his ass." 74 In words suggesting that his own legacy was at stake, Eisenhower added his hefty clout to the gathering momentum for war. Having appealed to military force, he told Johnson in a July 2 phone conversation, "You have to go all out! ... We are not going to be run out of a free country that we helped to establish." 75 General Maxwell Taylor, former JCS chairman and current ambassador to Saigon, now abandoned his previous opposition to sending American ground forces into Vietnam. The powerful enemy offensive recently unleashed, he later explained, "had completely overcome my former reluctance to use American ground troops in general combat." 7 6 And what about the man at the crossroads-the first president forced to confront head-on the contradictory impulses lodged in the Vietnam policy: either abandon an ally to Communism or commit American forces to save her? Associates later recalled a "man literally torn to pieces," wanting to do "anything rather than send more troops." 7 7 McNamara remembered a "very depressed" president in "constant turmoil," seeing neither a "plan for victory" nor an escape from obligations binding him to Vietnam. 7 8 Johnson's questions fired at political and military advisers reflected his tremors over the minefield ahead. Were they starting something they couldn't finish? Had they done everything possible on the negotiating front? Would China and Russia enter the fray? Was South Vietnam the best place to hold the line against Communist expansion? 7 9
The inner churning boiled over into his private life. "'I can't get out,"' he had groaned to Lady Bird. "'I can't finish it with what I have got. So what the Hell can I do?"' 8 0 On the verge of his final decision, she awakened in the early morning hours to his fitful sounds: "I don't want to get in a war and I don't see any way out of it. I've got to call up 600,000 boys, make them leave their homes and their families." Feeling guilty, like one abandoning her post, she dragged herself into a separate room to snatch another hour or two of restless sleep. With the window of opportunity closing fast in Vietnam, LBJ worked feverishly to push his Great Society through a balky Congress, rallying northern Democrats, cajoling foot-dragging Republicans, and ultimately achieving spectacular results for voting rights, education, health care and a host of other programs for his "war" on poverty and racism. Strained to the limit by months of Vietnam, Selma, Watts, and Congressional battles, his body, beset by severe heart problems and prone to break down under to Ball's own accounts and documentary evidence, however, he continued to pepper the president with memos opposing the drift toward war. Johnson always read them, after which he would call a meeting and call on Ball to present his views. Barrett also portrays a broader advisory process shaping Johnson's decision-making. Dovish voices commanded his attention even as hawkish advisers dragged him "kicking and screaming" toward escalation. Going beyond formal channels, he turned repeatedly to strong anti-war senators like Fulbright, Russell 206. Politics certainly influenced LBJ's Vietnam policy, but his middle course diplomacy, owed much to other factors-his penchant for working toward consensus, for example, and the widespread repugnance for both horns of his dilemma: the dread of either surrendering South Vietnam to the Communists with probable retribution impending or sending American boys into war. political pressure, collapsed in an excruciating attack of kidney stones at summer's end, followed by removal of his gall bladder. Lady Bird kept a black dress in her White House closet, anticipating Lyndon's possible death in office. 85 On July 28, the president announced his approval for the military commitment setting the wheels in motion for the Americanization of the war. After the lessons of "Hitler at Munich" and the "solemn pledges" of four presidents, he told the public, "We just cannot now dishonor our word ... or leave those who ... trusted us to the terror ... that would follow." 8 6 "We were sinking into quicksand," McNamara lamented. 87 
Conclusion
The debate over Johnson's responsibility for Vietnam extends to the post July 1965 period-beyond the primary focus of this study. His warmonger image was etched more deeply by his stubborn persistence in Vietnam amid soaring casualties, mounting protests and resignations from disillusioned advisers.
Yet, at what point, should he have thrown in the towel-and bow? Critics have strayed all over the field, from those flailing the "shoot-from-the-hip Texan ... who destroyed Vietnam to save his own ego" to those condemning the "timid, all-too-political war leader" for refusing to unleash the nation's fire power to win the war. 88 General Taylor concluded that Johnson's controlled warfare in Vietnam was "probably about right" for that most difficult of military operations-the "limited war" designed to avoid World War 111. 89 As the antiwar movement gathered steam, critics focused on a negotiated settlement as the key to ending the carnage. But with Hanoi apparently demanding nothing less than an American "sellout" of South Vietnam, as Taylor described it, early peace talks, themselves, would have undermined the American war strategy to achieve an acceptable compromise while providing a "priceless sounding board for enemy propaganda" as they waged war at leisure." 98 In 1966, even George Kennan, appalled at the misapplication of his Containment policy to Vietnam, warned U.S.
Senators that a "'precipitous ... withdrawal ... in present circumstances"' would undermine American interests and world peace. 91 No historian can whitewash the enormity of Johnson's tragic decisions for war in 1964-65 nor the personal flaws that increased his disposition to follow the hawkish herd rather than the dovish warnings of the Balls and the Mansfields. 9 2 Maybe Kennedy, more sophisticated in diplomacy, and more wary of the "miscalculations" endemic to warfare, would have cut loose from Vietnam in 1965, as some observers believe. 9 3 But after allowing the carnage to continue until he was safely re-elected, as he had planned, it would have taken an astonishing act of courage to cut the Gordian Knot at that late hour-the kind of moral heroism seldom seen in American politics.
Kennedy's "How the hell can you tell?" remains an enduring challenge, beckoning scholars to careful analysis when evaluating presidential performances and the unique pressures that shape them. Among the presidents who led America to war in Vietnam, no one was so deeply ensnared by predecessors' policies as Johnson; and no one had so sharp a break from previous policies as Eisenhower. Together, Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Accords provided a clear alternative. 94. The "sharp break," in this context, refers to the political rupture in 1954, which dictated a new political order for the Vietnamese and the U.S. Ideological and political pressures remained. Given the "loss of China," the Korean stalemate, the global cold war, the successful covert operations in Iran and Guatemala and Eisenhower's "New Look" diplomacy, Anderson argues, "abandoning South Vietnam to the communists" was an unrealistic option for him. Anderson, Trapped, pp. 21-22, 66-67. His perspective reminds us that alternatives are clearer to historians with 20-20 hindsight than to political leaders grappling with the dilemmas of the day.
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